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RESUMEN 
 En Portugal, como en otros países, las cooperativas agrícolas tienen un papel 
económico importante en el sistema alimentario. Similar a otras organizaciones económicas, 
las cooperativas agrícolas han sido testigos de cambios estructurales en las últimas décadas en 
términos de modelos de gobernación y gestión. Las cooperativas agrícolas portuguesas se han 
visto constreñidas por su contexto a adoptar un modelo tradicional de propiedad y control. El 
objetivo principal de este estudio era analizar cuestiones relacionadas con la estructura de 
gestión y desempeño financiero de las cooperativas, basada en los datos recogidos de 
cooperativas de aceite de oliva situadas en la región interior norte de Portugal. La 
combinación de un análisis cualitativo de la estructura y toma de decisiones, una evaluación 
financiera y la aplicación de un enfoque en varios criterios (PROMETHEE II), los resultados 
están en línea con expectativas (por ejemplo, bajos niveles de participación de los miembros, 
gestión no profesional, ratios de rentabilidad bajos, bajo apalancamiento y una capacidad para 
cumplir compromisos financieros), excepto la relación entre la gestión profesional y el 
desempeño financiero. La existencia de gestión profesional no conduce a mejores resultados 
financieros. Este resultado refuerza la creencia de que las cooperativas que están estructuradas 
de diferente manera tienen intereses diferentes y contradictorios a las partes interesadas. 
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ABSTRACT 
 In Portugal, as in other countries, agricultural cooperatives have an important 
economic role in the food system. Similar to other economic organisations, agricultural 
cooperatives have witnessed structural changes in recent decades in terms of governance 
and/or management models. Portuguese agricultural cooperatives have been compelled by 
their context to adopt a traditional model of ownership and control. The main goal of this 
study was to analyse issues related to the management structure and financial performance of 
cooperatives, based on data collected for olive oil cooperatives located in the northern interior 
region of Portugal. Combining a qualitative analysis of structure and decision-making, a 
financial assessment and the application of a multi-criteria approach (PROMETHEE II), the 
overall results are in line with expectations (e.g. low levels of member participation, non-
professional management, low profitability ratios, low leverage and an ability to fulfil 
financial commitments), except for the relationship between professional management and 
financial performance. The existence of professional management does not lead to better 
financial performance. This result reinforces the belief that cooperatives that are structured 
differently have different and conflicting stakeholder interests. 
Keywords: Traditional cooperatives, governance, financial indicators, PROMETHEE multi-
criteria approach. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Agricultural cooperatives have an important economic role in the European Union 
(EU) food system. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 54% of EU 
farmers were members of agricultural cooperatives. There were 38,000 agricultural 
cooperatives, and these held a 60% market share in the collecting, processing and marketing 
of agricultural products. Cooperatives provided 50% of the supply of agricultural factors of 
production, with 660,000 people employed by cooperatives in this area of activity and a total 
turnover of €251 billion (Santos, 2013). In the case of Portugal, detailed information about the 
quantity of agricultural raw materials marketed through cooperatives is scarce (COGECA, 
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2010). However, it is clear that cooperatives have an important role in dairy (i.e. milk), wine, 
olive oil and fruit and vegetables food chains, with a market share, in 2009, of 70%, 42%, 
30% and 25%, respectively (Rebelo & Caldas, 2012; 2015).  
 Most Portuguese olive oil cooperatives were founded during the 1960s, in a top-down 
process created to address problems in processing, stocking and marketing. These 
cooperatives are legally organised following traditional cooperative principles: open 
membership, democratic control, restricted residual claim and benefits proportional to 
members and patronage. Portuguese cooperatives have poorly defined property rights and, 
consequently, difficulties in assuming the risk of investments that could add value in the 
medium and long term (Rebelo& Caldas, 2015).  
 The Azeite de Trás-os-Montes protected designation of origin (PDO) olive oil 
cooperatives (Teixeira, 2014) are a good example of the cooperative model adopted by 
Portuguese agricultural cooperatives, even when issues related to governance model and 
financial performance are taken into account. Therefore, this study sought to identify the 
organisational structure of the olive oil cooperatives of the Azeite de Trás-os-Montes PDO 
and to understand the influence of management – professional or non-professional – upon 
their financial performance. In order to achieve the main goal of the study, the following 
specific objectives were identified: (i) analyse the management structure of the selected 
cooperatives; (ii) examine the financial performance of the cooperatives; (iii) determine 
whether a relationship exists between financial performance and the presence of a 
professional manager. 
 In order to achieve these objectives, interviews of board of director (BoD) members 
were conducted and firm documents analysed, including bylaws, annual reports and financial 
statements. Because of the multidimensional nature of the data, both qualitative and multi-
criteria approaches were used. 
 This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 includes a brief discussion of agricultural 
cooperative organisational models and financial performance. In section 3, the multi-criteria 
PROMETHEE method is explained. The remaining sections include the results (i.e. section 4) 
and the most relevant conclusions (i.e. section 5). 
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2. AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ORGANISATIONAL MODELS AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 The economic justification of agricultural cooperatives can be found at the level of 
member farms. Independent of their organisational model and sector, agricultural 
cooperatives are successful if they provide a higher net benefit to their members (e.g. final 
price of the product delivered, time of receipt, provided runoff and risk sharing) than that 
which members could achieved individually or outside their cooperative. As the main 
suppliers both of raw material and equity, members also decide on their cooperative’s retained 
earnings, investments and the final prices of farmers’ output. However, since the price of the 
raw materials is correlated with retained surplus and because the price of farm products 
delivered by members represents an important cost to the cooperative, accounting profit or 
ratio of profitability is not an adequate measure of this type of organisation’s performance 
(Soboh, Lansink, Giesen & Van Dijk, 2009).  
 Independent of how performance is measured, the financial sustainability of 
organisations clearly relies on their ability to create enough return in order to keep production 
processes running, compensating appropriately for the cost of factors of production. 
Organisations require resources to enable them to pursue their activities (Léon, 2001). 
 In the case of cooperatives, financial performance can be affected by issues related to 
ownership and the use of property rights. The type of ownership – expressed through the 
structure of property rights and governance – and, in particular, managerial duties delegated to 
professional managers and/or full-time directors are perhaps the best tools to analyse the 
incentives for farmer members of cooperatives to create, maintain and improve their assets. 
Analyses of ownership focus on two distinct concepts (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013): residual 
returns or claims and residual control.3 
 Drawing from property rights theory, Chaddad and Cook (2004) offer a typology of 
six cooperative models: traditional cooperatives, proportional investment cooperatives, 
member investor cooperatives, new generation cooperatives, cooperatives with capital seeking 
companies and investor share cooperatives. The main difference between these models is 
related to how property rights – in terms of residual claims or control – are attributed to the 
                                                           
3
 Residual rights of control are defined as the rights to make any decision regarding the use of assets that are not 
explicitly attenuated by law or assigned to other parties by contract. Residual rights of control emerge from the 
impossibility of crafting, implementing and enforcing complete contracts (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013:5). 
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economic agents that meet the needs of cooperatives’ members. More recently, Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos (2013) have identified four alternative organisational formats based on ownership 
rights: open corporation, proprietorship, financial mutual and traditional cooperative. In 
traditional cooperatives, residual returns are only assigned to members and/or patrons. There 
is no separation of ownership from other functions, and control rights are based on non-equity 
proportional voting rights (i.e. the democratic principle of one person, one vote). In addition, 
the horizon of residual claims is as wide as the patrons, no residual claim transferability 
exists, and the ability to redeem residual claims is essential to the BoD’s description. 
 Since agricultural cooperatives are located at the core of food chains – between 
production and markets – these organisations’ efficiency depends on what is occurring 
upstream (i.e. supply) and downstream (i.e. demand). In theory, the traditional cooperative 
model should prevail in non-competitive market structures, the presence of market failures 
(i.e. market power and asymmetric information) and homogeneity among economic and 
social members. In situations of perfect competition, both upstream and downstream, the 
economics literature recommends the adoption of other organisational forms, namely, 
investor-owned firms. In any case, in terms of market competition, the most efficient 
cooperatives are those that apply a business approach and have strong leadership, well defined 
business strategies and an efficient structure of human, physical and financial resources and 
organisations (Rebelo & Caldas, 2012). 
 In their organisation and operations, Portuguese cooperatives follow the traditional 
cooperative model (Rebelo & Caldas, 2015), including the internal governance model.4 The 
Portuguese cooperative code defines as mandatory the following governance bodies: a general 
assembly (GA), a BoD and a supervisory board (SB). The bylaws of each cooperative can 
also define other bodies, as well as give power to the GA or to the BoD to create special 
committees of limited duration in order to perform specific tasks. The GA is composed of all 
members, acting by simple majority. The president and vice-president of the GA, as well the 
BoD and SB, are composed only of members and elected from among members of the 
cooperative. The BoD can delegate some of its functions to managers. In the decision-making 
process, the democratic principle of one member, one vote is adopted by primary cooperatives 
– as is the case for Portuguese olive oil cooperatives – with two exceptions: cooperatives 
whose members are part of other exclusive cooperatives and secondary cooperatives, 
                                                           
4
 Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013) provide a clear description of governance models adopted in different countries 
by focusing on the allocation of decision-making functions and formal and real authority. 
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federations and confederations. In this case, bylaws can attribute to each member a certain 
number of votes based on objective criteria.  
 In general, smaller Portuguese agricultural cooperatives follow the so-called 
‘Mediterranean model’ of governance, characterised by the adoption of traditional principles 
and non-professional management (Rebelo, Caldas & Matulich, 2010). In these cooperatives, 
some members are simultaneously owners, suppliers and managers or supervisors, creating 
possible conflicts of interests (Lazzarini, Neto & Chaddad, 1999). When questioned about the 
issue, the Portuguese agricultural cooperative leaders do not have a unanimous answer for the 
question, ‘Is the traditional cooperative model imposed by cooperatives’ code a strong 
restriction on the competitiveness and development of long term entrepreneurial strategies?’ 
For cooperatives well positioned in the agro-food chain and with low leverage levels, 
compliance to cooperative rules is not a significant restriction. The inverse is experienced by 
cooperatives with high leverage, a weak position in their market and problems attracting 
members and/or patrons (Rebelo & Caldas, 2015). In other words, it is not easy to provide a 
clearly answer to questions about agricultural cooperatives’ efficiency. 
 The presence of management professionals in cooperatives has been restricted by 
several factors present not only in statutory bodies but also among managers themselves 
(Martí, 2004). Aragonés (1987) states that the entry of professional managers is conditioned 
by certain factors, such as the poor image some professionals have of cooperatives, 
ideological or philosophical resistance manifested by other managers, lower wages and 
subjective assessment of managers’ tasks. In addition, some professionals feel insecure 
because of possible administration changes and comments that may appear and negate these 
managers’ performance. 
 Nonetheless, Moral’s (2004) study in the region of Jaén, Spain, shows that the 
majority of members do not participate or get involved in the management of the cooperatives 
with which they are associated. Members tend to see their cooperatives as a firm that provides 
them services rather than as an enterprise that they co-own. Power is held by its members, 
but, as these are risk averse, the activities of the governing bodies are limited. 
 Despite limitations on the ownership of property rights, traditional cooperatives face 
the same problems that investor-owned firms do. However, the solutions to these problems 
vary due to differences developing out of the pursuit of dissimilar goals. On the one hand, 
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traditional cooperatives seek to maximise the value of their members’ products by way of the 
price paid for these products. On the other hand, investor-owned firms seek profit 
maximisation (Rebelo et al., 2010). 
 Given cooperatives’ specific realities, different management models need to be 
analysed in other to improve the knowledge of structure, behaviour and performance of this 
kind of organizations. For example, Hamel’s (2000) approach offers the possibility of 
integrating values in order to distinguish organisations from their competitors and build a link 
between members’ expectations and the firms’ strategic positioning. Among the mainstays of 
providing business proposals and promises to customers, analysts must consider customer 
interface, mission and strategies, strategic resources and value creation networks. In contrast, 
the specific cooperative management model developed by Côté (2007) takes into account the 
duality of ‘mutuality and enterprise’. According to the cited author, business practices should 
be implemented to ensure resource sharing, cohesion among cooperative members and a 
common understanding of issues and challenges that confront cooperatives. In addition, 
cooperatives’ management models always need to consider the core ideology that acts as the 
genetic code of organisations. These are the values that each cooperative should consider as 
providing inspiration and purpose. 
 In summary, in agricultural cooperatives, which are a mix of vertical integration and 
horizontal coordination, the difficulties in measuring financial performance start with the 
concept of a firm and continue with the definition and alignment of the main stakeholders’ 
economic objectives. In general, the dominant viewpoint in the economics literature is to 
consider agricultural cooperative as user-owned and user-controlled organisations that seek to 
benefit members and/or patrons who coexist internally as different groups of stakeholders. 
Members, directors and managers each having their own objectives, which are not necessarily 
aligned (Rebelo et al., 2010). These issues require an assessment that integrates the 
governance/management structure and financial performance of the cooperatives studied. 
Concerning financial performance, the empirical studies that dominate the literature use 
financial ratios applied to investor-owned firms, with the necessary adjustments to capture the 
specific nature of each cooperative (Soboh et al., 2009). For instance, in small, traditional 
agricultural cooperatives, low participation of members in cooperative decisions is expected. 
Some directors also tend to be managers, and low profitability ratios, low risk investment 
decisions, low leverage (i.e. high financial autonomy) are common. However, these 
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cooperatives have difficulties in financing short (or long) term assets with short (or long) term 
capital and honouring short-term financial commitments. These organisations reveal better 
financial indicators if managed by professional staff.  
3. THE PROMETHEE II APPROACH 
 Analyses of annual reports, interviews and visits to cooperatives allow researchers to 
study cooperatives’ organisational structure, members’ behaviour and management and 
agency relationships. This approach contributes to a multi-criteria analysis framework and 
allows conclusions about the relationship between financial performance and professional 
management. 
 The economic and financial information contained in annual reports submitted by 
cooperatives’ management is the baseline by which to assess the financial performance of the 
olive oil cooperatives selected for the present study. To this end, the information collected 
was compiled according to economic and financial indicators, in which five categories of 
economic indicators were used: risk, profitability, debt/structure, liquidity and activity. 
 Subsequently, given the multi-dimensional nature of the data, a method of multi-
criteria analysis was used (Kalogeras, Baourakis, Zopounidis & Dijk, 2005), more 
specifically, the PROMETHEE overlapping method. This method considers a finite set of 
alternatives that are evaluated by a finite number of criteria, yielding over-classification, non-
compensatory relationships among the alternatives (Rodriguez, Costa & Carmo, 2013). This 
method is easy to use, and its results are robust (Taillandier & Stinckwich, 2011). 
 In order to apply PROMETHEE II, every analysis criterion is assigned a weight whose 
importance is defined by the decision-maker. The structure of preferences is obtained by the 
combination of alternate pairs and the greater the deviation, the greater the preference for each 
alternative as opposed to the alternative to which it was compared. Each preference reflects 
the classification of one criterion over another, and it can assume values between 0 and 1 
(Morte, 2013). 
 The existing alternatives regarding each criterion are compared by a preference 
relation, setting a value Pj (a,b) that represents the preference intensity of alternative a in 
relation to alternative b (Rei, 2013). The preferences between alternatives are adopted by the 
decision-maker according to six types of functions (see Table 1). 
Management and financial performance of agricultural cooperatives…
 
REVESCO Nº 123 - Primer Cuatrimestre 201
 
Table 1. Preference functions of the 
Function Type Mathematical Representation
I. Usual Criterion 
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 Since only cooperative members can legally be part of governance bodies and, in 
elections, the democratic principle of one person, one vote is applied, a problem arises related 
to the election of members who are inexperienced and lack management knowledge. 
Although they delegate management tasks to qualified professionals, these inexperienced 
members can interfere in cooperative management. Therefore, it is important to understand 
how the selected cooperatives’ management is influenced by governance bodies, members’ 
behaviour, organisation size and human resource structure. 
 The cooperatives analysed present dissimilar membership structures, varying between 
400 and 2,200 members, and the participation – measured by the number of members who 
supply olives – also differs. The present study revealed, either through managers’ opinions or 
GA attendance, that there is a trend for individualistic behaviour and for members to behave 
as mere suppliers, viewing their cooperative only as a firm that buys members’ olives and not 
as a firm in which members are also shareholders. However, nothing concrete can be reported 
about the behaviour of members in terms of favouring short-term decisions about investments 
with long-term effects or members’ risk aversion, because the interviews revealed that 
managers’ opinions are not consensual. 
 Regarding production, it appears that, although the cooperatives under study belong to 
the same region, there are differences in terms of production and the quantities processed. In 
general, these cooperatives develop their services by charging a fee: a percentage of the oil 
produced from the olives supplied by each member, which is retained by the cooperative to 
pay for the production service. However, in one of the cases studied, the olives are acquired 
from members, who thus become mere suppliers of raw materials. The fee charged varies 
according to management decisions and differs from one cooperative to another. Olive 
production varies from year to year, which causes annual production fluctuations in all 
cooperatives. Nonetheless, considerable differences were observed between the cooperatives 
analysed: the lowest production, on average, was approximately 50,000 litres of olive oil/year, 
whilst the highest was around 1.7 million litres. The average production of the cooperatives 
was around 700,000 litres. However, most members’ production fell below 500 litres of oil 
per year, which means that these members are the most representative. It is important to note 
that the cooperatives are limited to only transforming raw material received from their 
members, which means that oil production is dependent on members’ olive production and 
supply. 
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 In terms of human resources, each cooperative employs an average of nine staff 
members. The greatest number of registered employees is 20, which occurred in a multi-
sector cooperative, with only one employee dedicated to the olive sector. Of the cooperatives 
in the region employing more than 10 employees, only one is exclusively dedicated to olive 
processing, and the remaining three are multi-sector cooperatives. There is only one 
cooperative that works with one employee, while the other cooperatives employ between six 
and nine employees. Production staff add up to the greatest number (about 50% of all 
employees), followed by administrative staff. However, directors who do not perform 
management functions have a significant weight as compared to professional managers and/or 
executive directors. It is worthwhile noting that the number of agronomy and economics 
technicians and commercial staff is quite small. 
 The main issue in the analysis of the cooperatives’ human resources is related to 
management as this reveals how the cooperatives are managed and what the relationship 
between management and financial performance is. Of the 11 cooperatives studied, four have 
a professional manager (i.e. an employee external to the BoD), and five have an executive 
manager whose duties combine this position with the presidency of the BoD. In the case of 
the cooperative with only one employee, all management tasks are performed by the sole 
employee and, in the exceptional case of Cooperative 7, which only operates during the olive 
oil production period, management is the responsibility of the three BoD members. These last 
make all necessary decisions before beginning the production season and resolve any sporadic 
issues by BoD consent. 
 The links between cooperatives’ management and governance bodies can be verified 
by the existing agency relationship between their BoD and professional managers. According 
to the interview data, the activity and/or functions of managers and/or executive directors are 
closely monitored by the BoD in about 73% of cases. Therefore, managers’ power of decision 
is shown to be limited by the BoD’s influence. Only two of the cooperatives studied have a 
connection between the managers and/or executive directors’ compensation and cooperative 
objectives, that is, a fraction of their income is related to bonuses for achieving predetermined 
goals. There is only one situation found in which management receives non-cash incentives. 
 In terms of age group, the majority of executives are older than 51 years old (67% of 
cases). However, the length of time that employees have worked for the cooperatives is 
equally important to understanding whether the most enduring relationships lead to better 
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results. Data analysis showed that in seven out of 10 cooperatives, the administrators have 
been with the organisation from the beginning of the period analysed (i.e. 2003). Cooperative 
2 is an exception to this, as it began its activities in 2008. In the case of Cooperatives 4, 5 and 
8, the managers and/or executive directors had already worked for the firms for over 10 years. 
In the remaining three cooperatives, the situations were different as management substitutions 
had occurred through the election of new governance bodies and the hiring of managers who 
were not previously staff members. 
 The level of education of managers and/or executive directors was selected as the 
main factor in the analysis of the relationship between cooperatives’ financial performance 
and the existence or not of professional managers. It was found that most managers and/or 
executive directors report levels of education higher than secondary school (i.e. twelfth 
grade). Approximately 42% of the managers and/or executive directors have degrees in 
agricultural sciences and other related areas, and, in 33% of cases, managers have degrees in 
economics and business. Only three cooperatives in the region have managers and/or 
executive directors without a higher education degree. 
 The intervention of directors in management activities could also be observed, as 
directors were chief executive officers themselves or controlled managers and, in six of the 11 
cooperatives, the directors were managers themselves, with no other employee performing 
management functions. In order to be able to study the relationship between the cooperatives’ 
structure, management and financial performance, any connections that might justify the 
ranking of each cooperative were examined through a multi-criteria analysis method based on 
the analysis of financial performance, as discussed in the next section. This was done by 
calculating financial indicators and ratios. Based on Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe and Jordan’s 
(2009) work, several indicators were computed in order to achieve this objective (see Table 
2). 
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Table 2. Definitions of variables 
Category Indicator Interpretation 
Risk 
Safety Margin 
Measurement used to study production 
requirements in relation to variable and fixed 
costs incurred 
Degree of Operating Leverage  
Measurement of business risk; impact of a 
percentage variation in the quantities produced 
and sold on the percentage variation of 
operating results  
Degree of Financial Leverage 
Measurement of financial risk; impact of a 
percentage variation in the operating results on 
the percentage variation of net profits 
Profitability 
Profitability of Production 
Measurement of the funds generated by 
production after payment of factors of 
production and taxes on cooperatives’ earnings 
Return on Assets 
Measurement used to assess if an increase in 
debt increases or slows down the return on 
capital of each organisation  
Net Profitability 
Measurement used to verify the return on 
investment; weight of the net profit within the 
total equity, allowing a comparison with other 
risk-free assets to verify the appropriate level of 
risk 
Debt/Structure 
Financial Autonomy Measurement that shows if assets are based on 
equity financing or borrowed capital  
Debt-to-Equity 
Measurement that relates debt to equity capital 
(i.e. relationship between total liability and 
equity capital) 
Minimum Financial Commitment 
Measurement analysing the importance of 
permanent capital in the financing of noncurrent 
assets  
Asset Structure Measurement of investments made in assets and 
capital intensity  
Liquidity 
Current Ratio 
Measurements that verify organisations’ 





Cash Cycle  
Measurement used to examine the disparity 
between business and treasury cycles (i.e. 
analysis of debt policies)  
Working Capital (€) 
Measurements assessing cooperatives’ capacity 
to honour long-term financial commitments  
Net Working Capital (€) 
Source: Adapted from Ross et al. (2009) 
 As shown in Table 2, 16 indicators were calculated for the 11 cooperatives and used to 
analyse their financial structure. Later, these indicators were run through Visual 
PROMETHEE Academic software to rank the cooperatives from first to last in terms of 
financial sustainability. 
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Table 3. Financial indicators (2003–2012) 
Economic and Financial Indicators 
 
Average Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Safety Margin -92.28% -13,207.16% 1,828.79% 14.09 -1,527.18% 
Degree of Operating Leverage 3.29 -254.09 70.57 29.28 890.42% 
Degree of Financial Leverage 2.76 -2.38 33.95 5.32 193.19% 
Profitability Margin -0.93% -60.57% 39.80% 0.13 -1,436.04% 
Return on Assets 1.43% -14.83% 19.53% 0.05 379.04% 
Net Profitability 0.33% -98.50% 124.47% 0.23 6,922.82% 
Financial Autonomy 43.86% -60.29% 89.57% 0.34 78.34% 
Debt-to-Equity 0.47 -16.77 5.58 2.77 586.29% 
Minimum Financial Commitment 1.20 -0.15 2.99 0.61 50.76% 
Asset Structure 56.80% 19.10% 123.42% 0.20 35.49% 
Current Ratio 11.55 -7.67 912.72 94.49 818.19% 
Quick Ratio 9.70 -7.67 773.40 80.08 825.42% 
Cash Ratio 7.31 -0.03 635.33 65.85 901.26% 
Cash Cycle  -43.61 -10,348.03 902.59 1,085.13 -2,488.51% 
Working Capital (€) 940.99 -1,155,494.81 1,272,495.13 417,270.30 44,343.95% 
Net Working Capital (€) 270,638.83 -911,579.73 4,525.012.30 870,792.57 321.75% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on annual reports and financial statements 
 In accordance to Table 3, the safety margin (i.e. (production – break-even 
point)/production) reveals the problem associated with high variable costs that, in some years 
and at some cooperatives, are critically close to the value of production. Thus, the break-even 
point is higher than the value of production, yielding negative results. The average degree of 
operating leverage (DOL) (i.e. contribution margin/operating income) shows that, in 
operational terms, the cooperatives’ business risk is considerable, that is, regardless of the 
existence of debt, the risk level demonstrates the rigidity imposed by fixed costs. Overall, a 
1% fluctuation in the quantity produced and sold translates into a 3.29% variation in operating 
results. In terms of financial risk, the scenario for these cooperatives is more comfortable, as 
the average degree of financial leverage (i.e. operating income/earnings before tax) amounts 
to 2.76. In addition, although financial risk is not too far off from the calculated value of 
DOL, the minimum and maximum values are lower, meaning that financial risk is not a major 
concern. From an analysis of averages, it can be concluded that a 1% variation in operating 
results causes a 2.76% variation in net income, leading thus to greater debt. Therefore, it 
appears that the cooperatives have associated risks related to both their general activities and 
their need to resort to debt. 
 The average profitability of production (i.e. net income/production) shows a negative 
value, which shows the difficulty cooperatives have compensating for different productive 
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inputs, paying taxes and yet still generating funds through production. The return on assets 
(ROA), which can contribute to the generation of results by managing minimal assets to 
generate the greatest possible result, can be measured by profitability (i.e. operating 
income/ROA) that, on average, amounts to 1.43% in the present studies’ analysis, meaning 
that assets are greater than operating income. In comparison to reference values, it appears 
that the cooperatives’ earning power is lower than the average cost of each company’s debts, 
which indicates that increased debt causes a decrease in net profitability. In terms of net 
profitability or return on equity (i.e. net income/equity), on average, there is a return of 
0.33%. This ratio is used by investors to determine whether the return on investment is 
appropriate for the level of risk. However, when comparing results to the capital asset pricing 
model and considering a return on assets without risk of 3%, the risk premium is less than 
zero, since the average value of the ratio is less than 3%. Thus, the cooperatives’ profits are 
reduced, as their objective is not to create return on capital for its members but instead to 
provide the service of olive processing. 
 The cooperatives’ financial autonomy (i.e. equity/assets) is, on average, quite good at 
43.86%. The higher the value for this indicator, the better the situation of each firm as it 
relates to the need for credit, that is, the cooperatives can offer better collateral to fulfil their 
responsibilities in the event of liquidation. In the case of debt-to-equity (i.e. liabilities/equity), 
the relationship can be measured between debt and equity. On average, the analysis results 
present a favourable ratio (i.e. lower than 1), in which liabilities are lower than equity – the 
best situation according to analysts. The cooperatives’ minimum financial commitment (i.e. 
permanent capital/noncurrent assets) is fulfilled, as the average shows that the cooperatives 
studied funded their assets, between 2003 and 2012, with capital whose maturity was greater 
than or equal to the assets’ economic life, as should be the case. As to asset structure, since 
specific high value machinery is required to process, extract and package olive oil, the 
average asset structure (i.e. noncurrent assets/total assets) value reveals that the weight of the 
cooperatives’ noncurrent assets is greater than the weight of current assets. In general, the 
cooperatives exhibit good funding capability, and they are well structured to maintain their 
activities. 
 The current ratio (i.e. current assets/current liabilities) needs to be greater than one in 
order to ensure that each cooperative is able to meet its short-term commitments, which was 
verified in the present analysis. In this study, five cooperatives showed, throughout the 10 
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years under review, a capacity for short-term commitments, with only one firm undergoing 
short-term financial disruption. However, liquidity can be understood in a narrower sense by 
only considering flexible assets. Consequently, in terms of the quick ratio (i.e. (current asset – 
inventories)/current liabilities), the average results demonstrate that, even by reducing the 
most liquid assets to flexible assets, the cooperatives under analysis are still capable of 
honouring their short-term commitments, even though this indicator’s value should be less 
than one. 
 Furthermore, it is possible to simplify the concept of liquidity further by considering 
that liquidity is only obtained through net financial means. Regarding the quick ratio (i.e. 
liquid financial asset/current liabilities), it appears that the cooperatives, on average, are able 
to meet their short-term commitments, as their net funds are more than seven times higher 
than their current liabilities are. Nevertheless, there is no need to maintain high levels of 
liquidity, which can instead be channelled towards required investments. 
 As a discrepancy was found between the cooperatives’ business and financial cycles, it 
was necessary to observe carefully the cash cycle (i.e. days inventory outstanding + days sales 
outstanding – days payment outstanding), whose average indicates that the average time 
obtained from credit providers is greater than the average length of loans to customers (i.e. a 
reduced business cycle of less than two days). In terms of working capital (i.e. current assets – 
current liabilities) and net working capital (i.e. inventories + accounts receivable + deferred 
income – accounts payable – deferred liabilities), an extremely unfavourable position, on 
average, was observed for the cooperatives studied. The average working capital is lower than 
the average value of the net working capital. Consequently, the cooperatives reveal problems 
related to their ability to fulfil commitments by their maturity date. Only four cooperatives, 
when the average of the years analysed was compared, presented greater working capital than 
their net working capital. The most negative situations – resulting from recent investments 
made in equipment modernisation and marketing – and the most severe cases were found to 
be cooperatives with stronger market positions. 
 Normally, cooperatives present both moderate business and financial risk, with 
business risk being higher than financial risk. These firms also show reduced profitability, 
high financial autonomy, compliance with minimum financial commitment standards, 
compliance with short-term financial commitments and high net working capital that exceeds 
their working capital. 
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 The results of the present study support the conclusion that, overall, the cooperatives 
of the Azeite de Trás-os-Montes PDO are financially sustainable. These firms’ least 
favourable condition is their high net working capital, which surpasses their working capital. 
In order to establish a hierarchy of financial sustainability, 11 cooperatives were submitted to 
a multi-criteria analysis. In addition, based on selected financial indicators, the firms’ 
positions in the resulting ranking and the ensuing relationship between their financial 
performance and professional management were determined. 
 The sample cooperatives were coded by number and unrelated to alphabetical order, 
ranking or other status. The parameters were set according to the type of function chosen for 
each criterion, taking into account the minimum and reasonable values for each of the 
analysed criteria. The parameters of profitability were set relatively low to reflect the usual 
values expected for cooperatives. 
 It was assumed that the weight of the indicators would be similar: elements of equal 
importance to the financial sustainability of cooperatives. In Tables 4 and 5, any intention to 
maximise or minimise the criteria is made clear by the weight (i.e. equal to one), the preferred 
function type and parameter values defined for each criterion. The definition of preferences is 
similar to the analysis performed to obtain the 10-year average for each cooperative and the 
analysis that considered only the last year studied (i.e. 2012). 
 The results cover three situations: the current position of the selected cooperatives, 
their evolution from 2003 to 2012, and an analysis of the bearing of different habits, which 
was reduced to covering the last three years. Thus, we first analysed a scenario in which each 
cooperatives was evaluated based on the final year of the analysis period (i.e. 2012). The 
firms were, subsequently, ranked by taking into account the average for 10 years calculated 
for each of the analysed criteria and, finally, analysed for the cooperatives’ situation in the last 
three years – from 2010 to 2012. 
 The calculation of Φ (Phi) is the difference between Φ+ (Phi+) and Φ- (Phi-). In 2012, 
the cooperative that placed first in the obtained ranking, with the best economic and financial 
situation, was Cooperative 5 (Φ = 0.1158), followed by Cooperative 10 (Φ = 0.0943). The 
cooperative that revealed the worst economic and financial situation was Cooperative 8, 
ranked eleventh. The calculation of the average for each indicator over the 10 years analysed 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Visual PROMETHEE Academic software 
– with the exception of the above cases – allowed us to establish a ranking that supports 
different conclusions from those verified in previous analyses. 
 In the second analysis, Cooperative 7 comes in first (Φ = 0.1642), whereas it was third 
in the previous ranking, followed by Cooperative 6 (Φ = 0.0642), ranked fourth. The last on 
the list is Cooperative 4 (Φ = -0.1114), which in 2012 occupied the seventh position. 
Remarkably, the cooperative that in 2012 had the best economic and financial conditions, 
when the average of each indicator is considered, falls to fourth place, and, simultaneously, 
the lowest ranking firm (i.e. Cooperative 8) takes seventh place when considering the 
indicators’ average. 
Table 4. PROMETHEE rankings for 2012 (left) and for 2003–2012 (right) 
 
Rank Cooperatives Phi Phi+ Phi- 
1 Coop. 5 0.1158 0.2154 0.0997 
2 Coop. 10 0.0943 0.1890 0.0947 
3 Coop. 7 0.0799 0.1516 0.0717 
4 Coop. 6 0.0694 0.1734 0.1040 
5 Coop. 2 0.0244 0.1100 0.0856 
6 Coop. 1 -0.0188 0.1057 0.1244 
7 Coop. 4 -0.0442 0.1377 0.1820 
8 Coop. 3 -0.0483 0.0955 0.1438 
9 Coop. 9 -0.0493 0.1270 0.1763 
10 Coop. 11 -0.0703 0.0673 0.1376 
11 Coop. 8 -0.1528 0.0481 0.2009 
 
 The position of each cooperative is made clear in Table 4, which sets forth the results 
of the cash flow for each cooperative, for the two different scenarios, based on results directly 
produced by the software. As shown in Table 5, when the last three-year ranking is compared 
to 2012, it appears that the differences are negligible, and only Cooperative 6 shows a three 
position drop (i.e. fourth to seventh place). Both ends of the ranking remain unchanged: 
Cooperative 5 is first, and the last is Cooperative 8. 
  
Rank Cooperatives Phi Phi+ Phi- 
1 Coop. 7 0.1642 0.2470 0.0829 
2 Coop. 6 0.0642 0.1513 0.0871 
3 Coop. 1 0.0613 0.1324 0.0712 
4 Coop. 5 0.0431 0.1842 0.1411 
5 Coop. 2 0.0213 0.0953 0.0741 
6 Coop. 11 -0.0152 0.0901 0.1053 
7 Coop. 8 -0.0183 0.0953 0.1135 
8 Coop. 9 -0.0206 0.1337 0.1544 
9 Coop. 3 -0.0809 0.0983 0.1792 
10 Coop. 10 -0.1075 0.0743 0.1818 
11 Coop. 4 -0.1114 0.0698 0.1812 
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Table 5.  PROMETHEE rankings for 2010–2013 
 
2010 2011 2012 Average Ranking 
Cooperative 5 0.1292 0.0948 0.1158 0.1133 1 
Cooperative 7 0.1693 -0.0193 0.0799 0.0766 2 
Cooperative 10 0.0295 -0.0576 0.0943 0.0221 3 
Cooperative 2 0.0086 0.0192 0.0244 0.0174 4 
Cooperative 4 -0.0495 0.1068 -0.0442 0.0044 5 
Cooperative 3 0.0385 0.0148 -0.0483 0.0017 6 
Cooperative 6 -0.0321 -0.0397 0.0694 -0.0008 7 
Cooperative 1 -0.0315 0.0172 -0.0188 -0.0110 8 
Cooperative 11 -0.0495 0.031 -0.0703 -0.0296 9 
Cooperative 9 -0.0929 -0.0573 -0.0493 -0.0665 10 
Cooperative 8 -0.1197 -0.1099 -0.1528 -0.1275 11 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Visual PROMETHEE Academic software 
 However, if the comparison takes into account the indicators’ average for the 10 years 
analysed, there are both significant positive and substantial negative changes. Cooperative 10 
rises from second-to-last to third place, and Cooperative 4, which was last, moves up to fifth, 
while Cooperatives 6 and 1 fall five places, from second to seventh and third to eighth place, 
respectively. 
 Since the largest cooperatives – those with a strong presence in the domestic market 
and with the highest assets, equity and liabilities – occupy the last three places, a reason for 
these results must be found. The most likely cause, based on an analysis of financial 
statements, is the high level of debt created by greater asset investment and the relationship 
between working capital and working capital needs, as well as the treasury cycle.  
 In order to validate these causes, a sensitivity analysis was conducted by changing the 
weight assigned to these criteria in the average of the indicators between 2003 and 2012, 
reducing their representation in the model. It was found that the change in weight assigned to 
debt and activity indicators produces changes in terms of ranking. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the problem associated with the cooperatives of the Azeite de Trás-os-Montes PDO with 
a stronger presence in the market (i.e. Cooperatives 8, 9 and 11) is related to debt levels and 
difficulties in honouring long-term commitments due to an excessive difference between 
working capital needs and working capital. 
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Table 6. PROMETHEE ranking averages from 2003 to 2012, with changes in the weight 







Source: Authors’ calculations using Visual PROMETHEE Academic software 
 As PROMETHEE II is a total ranking method, the ranking is obtained by taking into 
account the derived flows, based on the difference between positive and negative flows. The 
positive flow (Phi+) represents the cases in which the alternative a supersedes all other 
alternatives. In contrast, the negative flow (Phi-) represents the cases in which the alternative 
a is superseded by other alternatives. In this way, the overall ranking is given as Phi (a) = 
Phi+ (a) – Phi- (a), so that a is preferable to b if Phi (a) > Phi (b). 
 Given the results obtained – despite providing a better understanding of the evolution 
of cooperatives – the 10-year average is less reliable than the last three-year analysis, as the 
former enables an impact analysis of the alternative bearing of habits and efforts made in 
recent years, as well as considering the data available for the 11 cooperatives. In addition, 
considering only the last three years in the present study reduces the influence of possible 
management changes, an approach that, thus, is more advisable when seeking to verify the 
relationship between financial performance and professional management. 
 Therefore, based on the ranking resulting from the last three years of analysis (2010–
2012), it appears that the cooperatives located above the sixth position are those with 
executive officers and other situations (i.e. decisions made at the management level) with 
professionals who have a degree in agriculture and other relevant fields. However, it cannot 
be stated that this is the best structure for cooperatives. The results indicate that professional 
management is not essential to ensure financial sustainability in the case of the cooperatives 
studied. 
Rank Cooperatives Phi Phi+ Phi- 
1 Coop. 5 0.1320 0.2500 0.1180 
2 Coop. 1 0.1201 0.1732 0.0531 
3 Coop. 7 0.0866 0.2168 0.1302 
4 Coop. 6 0.0455 0.1316 0.0861 
5 Coop. 8 0.0356 0.1291 0.0935 
6 Coop. 11 0.0006 0.0978 0.0972 
7 Coop. 9 -0.0067 0.1474 0.1541 
8 Coop. 2 -0.0379 0.0690 0.1069 
9 Coop. 4 -0.0752 0.1002 0.1755 
10 Coop. 3 -0.0974 0.1261 0.2235 
11 Coop. 10 -0.2032 0.0382 0.2414 
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 The information contained in Table 7 allows us to reject the idea that cooperatives’ 
financial performance is better if there is professional management. In our case the 
cooperatives without professional management were found to have better economic and 
financial performance. However, these results should not be over-generalized because the 
differences found may be caused by different levels of control and interference by the 
compulsory cooperatives’ governance bodies that limit managers’ scope of action. 
Table 7. Relationship between and management structure and financial performance 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on interviews and computations  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 This study contributes to a greater understanding of the managerial structure and 
financial performance of cooperatives, with a focus on the specific case of Portuguese olive 
oil cooperatives located in the Trás-os-Montes DOP region. The cooperatives studied are 
organised according the traditional model of governance adopted by the vast majority of 
small, local cooperatives in Mediterranean EU countries, supported by an organisational 
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structure in which the BoD is elected by the GA from among cooperative members and 
controlled by the SB. The BoD can appoint a manager or a executive director to whom the 
board delegates current management tasks. 
 In this study, in most cases the BoD is the management, although, in five cooperatives 
there is an executive director. In terms of age, the majority of the managers and/or executive 
directors are between 51 and 65 years old. They joined the cooperative before the start date of 
the study (i.e. 2003), and they have higher education degrees in agricultural sciences and 
similar fields and/or economic and business fields. 
 The indicators of financial performance selected for analysis allowed us to conclude 
that the cooperatives present, on average, moderate risk and that their business risk is higher 
than their financial risk. In addition, the profitability of production and financial assets are 
low, which are in line with finding that the goal of cooperatives is not profit maximisation but 
instead surplus maximising. In terms of debt, the cooperatives show satisfactory ratios of 
financial autonomy and moderate debt, except for those that have made significant 
investments in recent years. A liquidity analysis showed that the cooperatives have the 
capacity to meet their short-term commitments. Overall, the cooperatives of the Azeite de 
Trás-os-Montes PDO region are financially sustainable, yet they need to be careful in 
regulating their investments and need for working capital. 
 The application of a multi-criteria analysis showed that the existence of a manager 
does not enhance financial performance. However, the best positioned cooperatives benefit 
from executive directors who mostly have higher education degrees in agriculture.  
 In summary, the results confirm the hypotheses of low levels of participation of 
members in cooperatives’ decision-making processes, the tendency of directors to be also 
managers, low profitability ratios, low risk investment decisions and an ability to honour 
financial commitments. The hypothesis of low leverage is partially verified, leading to the 
conclusion that cooperatives have stable and satisfactory financial autonomy, and that they 
are able to meet the minimum financial commitment rule. Finally, the hypothesis of better 
financial indicators for cooperatives managed by professional executives is refuted, since 
cooperatives with professional management from 2003 to 2012 did not present better financial 
performance. This result reinforces the belief that cooperatives that are structured differently 
have different and conflicting stakeholder interests. In this study’s findings, cooperatives with 
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professional managers seek to assume more long-term investments financed by loans, with 
negative consequences on leverage and other financial indicators.  
 The limitations of the results are related to the use of static financial and economic 
indicators that do not include social features of the selected firms, as well as the use of a 
multi-criteria analysis framework and respective parameters that were chosen according to the 
preferences of the decision-maker. Thus, future research needs to focus on evaluating 
financial performance by analysing financial flows. Studies should consider the impact of 
settlement prices for raw materials (i.e. the practice of patronage refund), use another multi-
criteria method and consider the impact of cooperatives upon agriculture appreciation and 
regions with desertification and aging problems (i.e. challenging regions). It would also be 
important to conduct research on how to balance financial goals and social objectives 
underlying the externalities produced in order to measure the economic, financial and social 
performance of agricultural cooperatives. 
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